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Our aim in this paper is to obtain a measure of the potential beneﬁto fr e -
ducing the likelihood of economic crises. We deﬁne an economic crisis as a
Depression-style collapse of economic activity. Based on the observed frequency
of Depression-like events, we estimate this likelihood to be approximately once
every 83 years for the US. Even for this small probability of transiting into a
Depression-like state, the welfare gain from setting it to zero can range between
1.05 percent and 6.59 percent of annual consumption, in perpetuity. These large
gains arise because even though the probability of encountering a Depression-
like state is small, it is highly persistent once it occurs. We also ﬁnd that
for some calibrations of the model, uninsured unemployment risk contributes
signiﬁc a n t l yt ot h es i z eo ft h e s eg a i n s .1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A central concern in macroeconomics has been whether policy should attempt to
stabilize cyclical ﬂuctuations. In a thought-provoking argument, Lucas (1987)
suggested that the welfare gains from eliminating postwar variability in aggre-
gate consumption was something on the order of one-tenth of one percent of
annual U.S. consumption. In his view, these gains were too small to justify any
new initiatives to stabilize cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Lucas’ calculation assumed that aggregate risk is shared equally among all
individuals. Instead, Imrohoroglu (1989) examined the welfare cost of cyclical
ﬂuctuations in an environment in which individuals faced uninsured unemploy-
ment risk. She found that even when individuals cannot buy insurance against
income ﬂuctuations, their ability to accumulate a “buﬀer stock” of assets (or to
borrow against future income, if permitted) gives them considerable scope to
smooth consumption. Nevertheless, she estimated that in the presence of em-
pirically plausible idiosyncratic income shocks the welfare gain from elimination
of all cyclical volatility may be as high as three-tenths of one percent of total
consumption (for a modest risk-aversion parameter). However, Atkeson and
Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1999) pointed out that if countercyclical
policies stabilize aggregate unemployment by simply removing the correlation
between the unemployment risks faced by diﬀerent individuals (leaving intact
individual employment prospects), the welfare gain from stabilization policies
are much smaller.
Following a diﬀerent line of thought, a number of authors have pursued the
implications of alternative and less restrictive preference speciﬁcations on the
magnitude of the welfare gains in Lucas’s representative agent calculation (Ob-
stfeld (1994), Dolmas (1998), and Alvarez and Jermann (1999), among others).
These studies have obtained much larger welfare costs of business cycles. How-
ever, Otrok (forthcoming) argues that when preference parameters are chosen to
be consistent with business-cycle behavior, the welfare costs of business cycles
are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained by Lucas.
1The repeated ﬁndings of small gains of eliminating cyclical ﬂuctuations mo-
tivates us to explore a diﬀerent reason why stabilization policies might have a
more signiﬁcant quantitative eﬀect on welfare.1 T h ea v e n u ew es t u d yi sb e s t
motivated by Figure 1, which plots the annual unemployment rate for the period
1900 to 1998.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate 1900-1998
As is evident, a striking aspect of this time series is the extraordinary rise in
1Other researchers have begun to explore alternative mechanisms through which cyclical
volatility may have a more substantial eﬀect on welfare. Beaudry and Pages (1999) examine
the welfare costs of business cycles in an environment where frictions in contract enforcement
cause workers to face cyclical wage risk. Portier and Puch (1999) examine the welfare ef-
fects of a reduction in volatility of fundamentals allowing for induced changes in the desired
steady-state capital stock. Cohen (2000) examines the case where stabilization policies pre-
vent shortfalls in economic activity and so aﬀect both the mean and volatility of economic
activity. Barlevy (1999), Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti (1999), and Matheron and Maury
(2000) reconsider the costs of cyclical volatility when such volatility can aﬀect the growth rate
of the economy.
2unemployment between the years 1930 and 1939, generally identiﬁed in history
as the Depression years.2 One issue, among many, suggested by the picture is
the potential for stabilization policies to lower the likelihood of economic crises.
It is clear that the post-WWII sample studied by Lucas, Imrohoroglu, and others
focusses on the beneﬁts of stabilizing standard business cycle ﬂuctuations and
neglects the beneﬁts of preventing economic crises like the Great Depression.
With this in mind, the aim of our paper is to answer the question: “What
fraction of consumption would a worker be willing to pay to set the current
probability of a Depression-like event to zero?” The answer provides a rough
guide to the beneﬁt of pursuing policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of
economic crises.
To answer this question we study an environment with the following features.
There are a large number of workers who encounter stochastic employment op-
portunities. The probability of ﬁnding employment depends on the aggregate
state of the economy. One of these aggregate states corresponds to an eco-
nomic crisis where the probability of ﬁnding employment in the private sector
is much lower relative to the other aggregate states. Workers cannot buy in-
surance against shocks to their employment status, but they can self-insure by
holding stocks of an asset whose return is lower than the (common) rate of time
preference of individuals.3 This environment permits us to model the deﬁning
characteristic of an economic crisis that is evident in Figure 1, namely, a very
high unemployment rate of workers.
Our calculations start with an estimate of the current likelihood of depres-
2For the period 1900-1940, the Lebergott series for industrial unemployment was con-
structed by dividing the total number of unemployed workers reported in Lebergott’s Table
A-3 by the sum of unemployed workers and nonfarm workers also reported in that table.
This construction assumes that most unemployed workers were in nonfarm occupations. The
unemployment rates for 1941 and later are just those reported by the BLS. The Romer se-
ries was constructed by applying the corrections suggested by Romer (1986) to the industrial
unemployment rate series.
3This assumption is consistent with the general equilibrium implications of imperfect in-
surance, as shown, for instance, by Aiyagari (1994).
3sions; the likelihood that we (counterfactually) set to zero in our welfare experi-
ments. We obtain an estimate of this likelihood by ﬁtting a three-state Markov
chain to the observed monthly chronology of expansions, contractions, and de-
pressions (in the U.S.) for the period 1900 to 1998.4 In ﬁtting one Markov chain
t ot h ee n t i r ep e r i o dw ei g n o r ea n yd i ﬀerence in the likelihood of depressions
between pre- and post-Depression eras. Under this assumption, we estimate the
current likelihood of encountering a depression to be once every 1000 months (or
once every 83 years). For a conservative baseline calibration, the steady-state
welfare gain from setting this small probability to zero is 1.05 percent of annual
consumption, in perpetuity. Taking into account the welfare gain along the
transition path, this estimate rises to 1.11 percent. Less conservative but more
plausible calibrations generally imply higher gains, with one scenario yielding
a 6 percent steady-state welfare gain and 6.6 percent welfare gain including
transition eﬀects.
Although our approach bears a methodological similarity to the literature on
the welfare cost of business cycles, there are two key diﬀerences with that liter-
ature that are worth emphasizing. First, setting the likelihood of a Depression-
like state to zero alters both the mean and volatility of individual earnings.
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h e s em e a ne ﬀects sets our welfare calculation apart from the
literature on the welfare cost of business cycles that focuses solely on eﬀects of
changes in volatility. Second, welfare gains reported in that literature are in
the nature of an upper bound because the elimination of all cyclical volatility
(which is what’s typically examined) may not be desirable. Such qualiﬁcations
are unnecessary for the Great Depression which most everyone agrees was, at
some level, preventable. The same is probably true of economic crises more
generally. If policies can be found to eliminate the possibility of an economic
crisis, the welfare gains reported in this paper, net of the cost of implementing
such policies, are potentially achievable.
4An alternative approach to estimating the likelihood of a Depression-like event is to link
it to the equity premium, as is done in Reitz (1988) and Danthine and Donaldson (1998).
42 Environment
Our environment builds on work by Imrohoroglu (1989). The economy evolves
through good (g),b a d(b), and depression (d) times that have implications for
employment prospects. The state of the economy η ∈ {g,b,d} is assumed to











where, for example, Pr{ηt+1 = g|ηt = b} = λgb.
The economy consists of a large number of inﬁnitely lived agents who diﬀer







where 0 < β < 1 is their discount factor and ct is their consumption in period






where γ > 0.
Agents are endowed with one indivisible unit of time each period. Each agent
receives an employment opportunity that is independent across agents. The
employment opportunity has two states, i ∈ {e,u}. If the employed state occurs
i = e, an agent produces y units of the consumption good. If the unemployed
state occurs i = u, an agent produces θy units of the consumption good through
household production, where 0 < θ < 1.
The individual-speciﬁc employment state is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order















5where, for example, Pr{it+1 = e|it = u,ηt+1 = g} = λ
g
eu is the probability that
an agent will be employed in good times at t+1given the agent was unemployed
in period t.
The overall employment prospects faced by each individual depend on both
the aggregate and individual states; that is, on the six pairs (η,i), η ∈ {g,b,d}
and i ∈ {e,u}. These six pairs are denoted by ω1,...,ω6,w h e r eω1 stands
for employed in a good state, ω2 stands for unemployed in a good state, ω3
stands for employed in a bad state, ω4 stands for unemployed in a bad state,
ω5 stands for employed in a Depression state, and ω6 stands for unemployed
in a depression state. The process governing ω is a ﬁrst-order Markov process




,w h e r ePr{ωt+1 = ωj | ωt = ωk}
= φjk. The transition probabilities are determined by Λ and Λη.F o re x a m p l e ,
if ωt = ω1, then the probability of ωt+1 = ω2, i.e., φ21, is given by λggλ
g
ue.
While event-contingent insurance is not permitted, agents can insure them-
selves by holding stocks of some asset. For the moment, this asset is taken to be
a storage technology with a zero real return (alternative asset market assump-
tions are explored later in the paper). Agents enter period t with individual




The maximization problem faced by an individual in this economy can be
represented as a discounted dynamic program where the state variables are
s = st and ω = ωt. Following standard notation, the Bellman equation for this
program is:







c(s,ω)=y(ω)+s − s0 ≥ 0,∀ω. (2)
6Since agents face idiosyncratic shocks, they may hold diﬀerent levels of sav-
ings. Let µt(s,ω) be the probability that an agent attains the state (s,ω). Then,







where Ξ(s0,ω)={s : s0 = s0(s,ω)}. Under mild regularity conditions (ergodicity
of the Markov process and the absence of cyclically moving subsets) the sequence
of recursively deﬁned distributions converges to a unique invariant distribution
µ(s,ω) from any initial distribution. The distribution µ(s,ω) gives the fraction
of time an individual is in state (s,ω).
3 Estimates of the Aggregate State Transition
Matrix
In order to estimate the aggregate state transition matrix we proceed by con-
structing a history of these aggregate states. We begin with the monthly NBER
business cycle chronology, which date from December 1854. We associate NBER
expansions with the good state and NBER contractions with the bad state. This
two-state history is then augmented with a deﬁnition of what it means to be in
a depression. If that deﬁnition is observed to be satisﬁed by some month, then
that month’s NBER classiﬁcation is changed to the depression state.
As noted in the introduction, we take the deﬁning characteristic of a depres-
sion to be very high incidence of unemployment among industrial workers. But
unemployment rate data is available only for the period beginning 1900, and
for the pre-WWII portion of that period it is available at an annual frequency
only. Because of this data limitation, we conﬁne our three-state history to the
period 1900 to 1998.5
5There is some fragmentary information on unemployment rates for the last decade of the
nineteenth century. One of the sensitivity analyses performed later in the paper takes this
information into account.
7For our baseline calculation, we classiﬁed all months of any year in which the
unemployment rate exceeded 17 percent as depression months. This deﬁnition
simply picks out the 120 months corresponding to the 1930-1939 period gen-
erally known as the “Depression years.”6 Accordingly, we changed the NBER
classiﬁcation of these months to the depression state. An alternative deﬁni-
tion considered later in the paper classiﬁes all months of any year in which the
unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent as depression months.7
Given this three-state history, the maximum likelihood estimate of λkj, the
(j,k)th element of the aggregate state transition matrix, is the ratio of the
number of times the economy switched from state j to state k to the number
of times the economy was observed to be in state j (Ross (1972) pp. 240-242).8
Implementing this procedure for the whole sample yields the following estimate
6Cole and Ohanian (1999) also identify the ten years between 1930 and 1939 as the period
during which output remained below trend.
7A more sophisticated alternative would be to ﬁt a 3-state regime to the unemployment rate
data using the procedure described in Hamilton (1989). We followed our simple procedure
because for the pre-WWII period the NBER chronology is likely to a better proxy for the
frequency of good and bad times than any that can be inferred from the noisy unemployment
series (see Romer (1986) for a discussion of the pitfalls of the pre-WWII unemployment series
for cyclical analysis).




t=1 1{ηt+1 = k}1{ηt = j}
PT−1
t=1 1{ηt = j}
Given the Markov structure of our problem, the asymptotic standard errors of these estimates
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8of Λ, with standard errors in parentheses below:
b Λ =

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
The estimated matrix has several noteworthy features. First, because there
is only one depression episode in our sample, there is only one transition into
and one transition out of the depression state. In the three-state history we
construct, the depression follows contractionary months and is followed by ex-
pansionary months. Hence λdg = λbd =0 . Second, the estimated matrix implies
that conditional on not being in a depression, the probability of falling into one
is 0.0010. Third, the unconditional probability of a depression is 0.0975, which
is an order of magnitude larger than the conditional probability. The large dis-
crepancy between these two probabilities reﬂects the fact that the depression
state is very persistent. This discrepancy is one reason why the welfare loss
from the possibility of a Depression-like event is relatively large, even though
the probability of encountering a Depression-like event, conditional on not being
in one, is quite small.9
A word about the precision of these estimates. The fact that there is only
one depression episode in our sample might be thought to imply that none of the
parameters relating to the third state (the third column and row of the Λ matrix)
can be reliably estimated. That’s not necessarily true. According to our history,
the economy spent about 1,070 months in nondepression states. Thus, there
were many instances in which the economy could have gone into a depression
but didn’t. The fact that the depression state was encountered only once out of
more than 1000 trials suggests we can be quite conﬁdent that the probability of
9The unconditional probability of a good state is 0.6951, and the unconditional probability
of a bad state is 0.2074.
9transiting into a depression state is very low. Similarly, the economy spent 120
months in the depression state before transiting out of it. The fact that it took
more than 100 trials for the economy to leave the depression state implies we
can be reasonably conﬁdent that the probability of continuing in the depression
state is quite high. As we shall see, these two features of a depression state,
namely, the low probability of encountering one and its persistence once it is
encountered, are the economically signiﬁcant features. These features are well-
supported by history.10
4 Calibration of Other Parameters
The calibration of the remaining parameters involves selecting parameter values
for the elements of the individual-level transition matrices Λη, the preference
parameters β and γ, and the earnings-loss parameter θ.
The Individual State Transition Matrix
The individual-level state transition matrix for each aggregate state is built
up from two pieces of information pertaining to that state, namely the average
unemployment rate in that state and the average duration of unemployment
spells in that state.
The average unemployment rate in the good, bad, and depression states were
ﬁxed at the average unemployment rate for these states in the whole sample.
These were 5.33 percent, 7.86 percent, and 23.48 percent, respectively. Since
the unemployment rate data is available at only annual frequencies for the pre-
WWII era, the average unemployment rate for each state was calculated for
10We note, however, that the standard errors reported in parentheses are asymptotic stan-
dard errors and needn’t be good estimates of the sampling variance in “small” samples. To
investigate the small sample properties of our maximum likelihood estimate of Λ,w er a n
Monte Carlo simulations where the data generation process is given by b Λ.A se x p e c t e d ,t h e
standard errors from the Monte Carlo simulations were larger than the asymptotic standard
errors. Furthermore, we found an upward bias in the estimates of λdb and λgd. Since correct-
ing b Λ for these biases only led to higher welfare gains of eliminating the depression-like state,
w er e t a i n e dt h em o r ec o n s e r v a t i v ee s t i m a t e so fb Λ reported in the paper.
10annual data. All non-Depression years in which there were at least nine ex-
pansionary months were classiﬁed as “good” years and all other non-Depression
years as “bad” years.11
T h ed u r a t i o no fu n e m p l o y m e n ts p e l l si ng o o da n db a dt i m e sa r eb a s e do nt h e
monthly average duration of unemployment rate reported by the BLS. These
were determined to be 2.75 months during expansions and 3.75 months during
contractions. The only available data on the duration of unemployment spells
for the Depression are for 1930 and 1931. By early 1930, 56 percent of male
unemployed workers had been without work for at least nine weeks. The spe-
cial census of unemployment undertaken in January 1931 reported that of the
male workers unemployed in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los
Angeles, 45.3 percent, 60.9 percent, 45.2 percent, 61.0 percent, and 33.2 per-
cent, respectively, had been jobless for at least 18 weeks. In eﬀect, the median
unemployment duration had doubled in less than a year. The fact that the un-
employment rate remained elevated for the next seven years suggests that the
median duration of unemployment by the end of the Depression was probably
a good deal higher than 18 weeks. We ﬁxed the average duration of unem-
ployment spells in the depression state as 10 months, roughly twice the median
duration seen in 1931.12
The choice of average duration of unemployment spells for each aggregate
11Because the unemployment rate falls during expansions and rises during contractions,
our procedure for calibrating Ug and Ub u n d e r e s t i m a t e st h et r u ed i ﬀerence between these
parameters. As a check, we estimated the average unemployment rate for the last six months of
each expansion and the average unemployment rate for the last six months of each contraction
in the postwar period (according to Romer (1986), the unemployment rate process for 1900-
1928 period is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in the postwar era, once allowance is made
for likely measurement errors in the prewar unemployment data). The estimates were 4.70
percent and 6.74 percent respectively. Since this method of estimating Ugand Ub leads to
uniformly lower values than what we estimate for our baseline calibration, we found that they
led to higher welfare gains (of eliminating the likelihood of depressions) than those reported
later in the paper.
12We perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the average duration of unemployment
in the Depression later in the paper.
11state ﬁxes λ
η




uu). We chose the remaining
elements to match the average unemployment rate in each aggregate state. Note
that the evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate is given by:
Ut = Ut−1λ
η(t)
uu +( 1− Ut−1)λ
η(t)
ue
where η(t) ∈ {g,b,d}. Since λ
η
uu etc. depend only on the current state, Ut
converges to a constant if the state remains unchanged for some length of time.
For each aggregate state, these limiting unemployment rates solve:
Uη = Uηλ
η
uu +( 1− Uη)λ
η
ue.
We chose the values of λ
η
ue,η ∈ {g,b,d}, so that Ug,Ub, and Ud matched 5.3
percent, 7.86 percent, and 23.48 percent, respectively.13




















Preference and Earning-Loss Parameters
We set β =0 .9946, which is equivalent to an annual discount rate of 6
percent. We arrived at this number by assuming a rate of time preference equal
to 4 percent at an annual rate as well as assuming that the constant monthly
survival probability is equal to 1−1/(40∗12) so that agents have a working life
of 40 years.
13These choices imply that average unemployment rate in the good state is somewhat larger
than Ug, and the average unemployment rate in the bad and depression states are somewhat
less than Ub and Ud, respectively. However, since all three states are highly persistent, these
discrepancies are minor.
14These matrices, along with Λ, imply the unconditional probabilities of being in states
ωj (i.e. prob(ωj)=φj,j=1 ,...,6) are given by φ1 =0 .6568, φ2 =0 .0382, φ3 =0 .1922,
φ4 =0 .0152, φ5 =0 .0756,a n dφ6 =0 .0220.
12For the baseline calibration, we set the risk aversion parameter, γ, to 1.5.
The value of θy is given by “home production.” According to Greenwood,
Rogerson, and Wright (1995) “attempts to measure the value of the output
of home-production come up with numbers between 20 and 50 percent of the
value of measured market GNP.” To be conservative, we set the earning loss
parameter θ to 0.5 in the baseline calibration.15
5 The Response of Per-capita Consumption in
a Depression
Since our main interest is in the Depression-like state, it is of interest to see
how well the model captures the decline in per-capita consumption during the
Great Depression. To do this, we simulated our model with the observed his-
tory of aggregate states, starting with an initial distribution of asset holdings
corresponding to the average over good states.16 Figure 2a plots the computed
percentage deviations of the simulated per-capita consumption against the per-
centage deviation in actual per-capita consumption.17 In the simulation, per-
capita consumption drops by about 12 percent in 1930, about 13 percent in 1931,
and then recovers to a decline of about 10-12 percent for the duration of the De-
pression. As the economy emerges from the Depression, per-capita consumption
rises sharply to around 5 percent above trend and then gradually declines to
15Darby (1976) pointed out that workers engaged in government relief programs during the
Depression were counted as unemployed. Darby also reports that the average wage earned by
these “unemployed” workers during the years 1930-1939 was about 41 percent of the average
wage during those years, which is lower than our baseline calibration of 50 percent.
16We obtain decision rules for optimal asset holdings by successive approximations on the
value function V (s,ω). We discretize the state space of asset holdings to lie between 0 and
10.8 in increments of 0.027 for a total of 401 grid points. The upper bound is roughly equal
to 11 months of income if the employed state continues for that long. In equilibrium, this
constraint is never binding.
17The consumption series is based, in part, on the annual Kendrick real consumption se-
ries for 1889-1953 reported in Appendix B of Gordon (1986), deﬂated by population. The
percentage deviations shown in the ﬁgure are taken from a quadratic trend.
13its “normal” level value by around 1945.18 In the data, per-capita consumption
doesn’t fall below trend until 1931 and reaches its trough of around 19 percent
in 1933. Then there is a recovery, with the path of consumption ending up in
the neighborhood of the simulated consumption path by around 1945.
The fact that the actual decline in consumption is deeper and occurs later
than in the simulation is not surprising. In the model, agents know right away
that they are in the Depression whereas the realization that something had gone
very wrong was gradual in reality. Also, actual unemployment peaked at more
than 30 percent, whereas the unemployment rate in the model peaks at less
than 24 percent. These diﬀerences suggest that a better metric for judging how
well the Depression is captured is to compare the cumulative consumption loss
between 1930 and 1945. In the model, the cumulative consumption loss is 78
percent of mean aggregate consumption; in the data the cumulative consump-
tion loss over the same period is 107 percent. While the consumption loss in
the model may seem too low in relation to the data, the data pertain only to
consumption goods purchased in the market. Because home production con-
tributes to consumption in the model, we need to make some assumption about
how much of the output of home production is actually measured as GNP. Fig-
ure 2a assumed that all of home production is measured. Figure 2b is drawn for
the polar opposite case where none of it is measured. The decline in per-capita
consumption is now much steeper because consumption in excess of home pro-
duction only is included for unemployed agents. The cumulative consumption
loss between 1930 and 1945 is now 170 percent, greater than in the data. If it
is assumed that 30 percent of home production is unmeasured, the cumulative
loss in consumption in the model matches that in the data.
To summarize: the predictions of the baseline model for the path of per-
capita consumption during a depression does not appear to be grossly inconsis-
tent with observations. We now turn to our welfare comparisons.
18The behavior of the path of consumption is explained in the next section.
146W e l f a r e C o m p a r i s o n s
Our focus is on the welfare gains from elimination of the Depression-like state. In
other words, we wish to compare the utility gain from moving to an environment




0.0745 0.9216 + 0.0039


The oﬀ-diagonal elements of this matrix are identical to the corresponding ele-
ments of Λ, as is λgg. But the probability of remaining in the bad state is now
higher by 0.0039. The individual level transition matrices for the good and bad
state are the same. The parameters γ, β and θ remain the same as well. Let
V ∗(s,ω) be the value function for this new, depression-proof, economy.
The welfare calculations are done in two ways. Imagine that the three-
state economy has attained its stochastic steady state. At some random date,
agents are given the choice of living in an environment with Λ∗. At that instant,
the economy will be in one of three possible states, and there will be a joint
distribution of agents across asset holdings and employment status. We can
imagine asking each agent in this distribution the maximum he is willing to pay
each period in the two-state depression-proof environment for the privilege of
living in that environment.
In the ﬁrst type of welfare calculation we assume that each individual begins
the new regime with his current asset-holding and employment status. In addi-
tion, we assume that if the economy is in the good or bad state then the new
regime will begin in that state as well, and if the economy is in the depression
s t a t et h e nt h en e wr e g i m ew i l lb e g i ni nt h eb a ds t a t e .T h u s ,t h ef r a c t i o no fc o n -
sumption the agent is willing to give up if he is currently in state (s,ω),ω ≤ 4,
is found by computing 1 − α(s,ω),w h e r eα(s,ω) solves:
V (s,ω)=α(s,ω)1−γV ∗(s,ω).
If the economy is in a depression, then α(s,5) and α(s,6) are computed as
15follows:
V (s,5) = α(s,5)1−γV ∗(s,3)
V (s,6) = α(s,6)1−γV ∗(s,4)
Denoting the invariant measure for the (three aggregate state) depression-prone
environment by µ(s,ω) (this probability distribution is the unconditional prob-
ability of an agent having assets s in state ω) the average gain in welfare across




ω µ(s,ω)α(s,ω). This calculation takes into
account the fact that in the depression-proof (two aggregate state) environment
agents hold less assets and so includes the consumption spree permitted by this
decumulation.
In the second type of calculation we assume that each agent is oﬀered the av-
erage lifetime utility in the depression-proof environment. In this case αSS(s,ω)
is given by:
V (s,ω)=αSS(s,ω)1−γ ¯ V ∗




ω µ∗(s,ω)V ∗(s,ω) with µ∗(s,ω) being the invariant distribu-





Thus, in this experiment the welfare gain from decumulation of assets along the
transition path is ignored. We refer to this measure as the steady-state gain in
welfare. Both calculations are reported in Table 2.
Table 2
% Welfare Gains in the Baseline Model From Eliminating Depression
From Eliminating Depression Estimates of Gains From Eliminating Cycles
1 − α 1 − αSS Lucas, γ =1 Imrohoroglu, γ =1 .5
1.11 1.05 0.01 0.3
The welfare gain including transition is 1.11 percent of consumption per
month (or per year) and the steady-state gain is 1.05 percent. To put these
numbers in perspective, note that Lucas estimated the welfare gain from elimi-
nating all cyclical volatility in the postwar era to be 0.01 percent of consumption
16for γ =1 , and Imrohoroglu estimated it to be 0.3 percent for γ =1 .5. Thus,
the welfare gain from getting rid of a Depression-like state is more than one
hundred times Lucas’s (1987) estimate of the gains from eliminating cycles and
more than three times as large as Imrohoroglu’s (1989) estimate.
Where do these gains come from? This question can be answered by com-
paring the operating characteristics of the three-state and two-state models.
Table 3
Steady-State Characteristics of the 2-state and 3-state Models





3 − S 0.9623 0.1320 1.0816 0.5907 0.9623 0.0859
2 − S 0.9705 0.1178 0.9207 0.2856 0.9705 0.0738
Table 3 indicates that the gain in welfare in the ﬁrst experiment comes from
three diﬀerent sources. First, average consumption in the two-state model is
higher by 0.85 percent (which implies that about 81 percent of the gain in wel-
fare is due to the increase in mean earnings); second, the standard deviation of
individual consumption is lower by 14.1 percent; and third, the average asset
holdings is lower by 14.9 percent. The welfare gain in the steady-state experi-
ment is due to the ﬁrst two of these three sources.
The largest contribution to welfare in both experiments comes from the
increase in mean income, and hence mean consumption, in the depression-proof
economy. Even though the probability of falling into a depression (conditional
on not being in one) is very low, the fact that the depression state is very
persistent makes mean income in the depression-prone (three-state) economy
slightly lower than the mean income in the depression-proof economy.
In addition, the volatility of individual consumption is signiﬁcantly higher
in the economy with the possibility of a depression. Because a depression is a
low-probability event, it does not inﬂuence decision rules for normal times very
much. This can be seen by comparing the asset accumulation/decumulation
decisions of employed/unemployed agents in the bad state with and without
17the possibility of a depression. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, these decision
rules are very similar. In this sense, agents do not prepare very much for a
depression. Consequently, when a depression does materialize, the consumption
paths of all agents change dramatically. As shown in Figure 5, unemployed
agents decumulate assets at a much slower pace (and consequently take a much
bigger hit in consumption) during a depression than at other times. Also, as
shown in Figure 6, employed agents recognizing the heightened probability of
unemployment accumulate assets at a much faster rate during a depression
relative to other times. Thus, employed agents also experience a decline in
consumption during a depression.
The diﬀerences in the decision rules between the depression and other times
helps explain the qualitative features of the path of aggregate consumption
shown in Figure 2a and 2b. The distribution of asset holdings for employed and
u n e m p l o y e da g e n t sa tt h es t a r to fo u rs i m u l a t e dD e p r e s s i o ni ss h o w ni nF i g u r e s7
a n d8 .N o t et h a tt h e r ei sal a r g em e a s u r eo fe m p l o y e da g e n t sw i t ha s s e t sb e t w e e n
0.9 and 1.1 and a fairly dispersed distribution of unemployed agents across asset
holdings. As the Depression hits, the optimal asset accumulation for the bulk of
employed agents jumps from a little above zero to somewhere between 0.10 and
0.15, and their level of consumption declines. At the same time, unemployed
agents begin conserving their asset holdings and their consumption level drops as
well. These drops in consumption for everyone in the economy accounts for the
initial drop in aggregate consumption in Figure 2a. As the Depression proceeds,
the rate of asset accumulation of employed agents begins to fall as they get closer
to their target asset level of a little over 4. Figure 9 shows the accumulation
of assets during the Depression. Thus, consumption of employed agents begins
to recover. This recovery is the reason why aggregate consumption begins to
recover as well. One factor that helps in this recovery is that agents who become
unemployed later in the Depression experience less of a decline in consumption
because they get the chance to accumulate more assets in the meantime. Thus,
even though the unemployment rate rises through the Depression, its negative
18inﬂuence on aggregate consumption becomes less marked.19
It is worth noting that the value functions for both employed and unemployed
agents are close to linear around the steady-state range of asset holdings (Figures
10 and 11). This is consistent with Bewley’s (1977) result that when the discount
factor is close to one, the marginal utility of asset holdings is nearly constant.
Finally, it may be of interest to know how much agents would be willing to
pay to eliminate the depression state conditional on being in a depression. We
ﬁnd that agents are willing to pay, on average, 4.63 percent of consumption to
receive the average steady-state utility of the depression-free economy.
7 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
Up to this point, we have kept to a conservative choice of parameter values in
order to drive home the point that it does not take much for the possibility of
a low-probability Depression-like event to impose signiﬁcant welfare costs. In
this section we examine how the estimate of the welfare gains from eliminating a
Depression-like state is altered as we vary asset market assumptions and param-
eter values in plausible directions. Some of these variations have surprisingly
little eﬀe c to nt h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ew e l f a r eg a i n sw h i l eo t h e r sr a i s ei ts i g n i ﬁcantly.
Using this information, we present at the end of this section the combined eﬀects
of a less conservative but more plausible calibration of the model.
7.1 Alternative Asset Market Assumptions
So far we have focused on the labor market consequences of a Depression-like
event. However, such an event is likely to have consequences for the asset
markets as well. In this section, we examine the eﬀect of some asset market
19The changes in consumption in our model occur even though the depression is assumed
not to aﬀect the income of employed or unemployed agents. Thus we ignore any decline in
productivity that may have occured during the Depression. Taking these eﬀects into account
would only raise our welfare gain estimates.
19changes that may, plausibly, be associated with the occurence of a Depression-
like event.
The Eﬀects of a Price Level Drop During a Depression
In the baseline model we assumed the asset to have a zero real return. Now,
we interpret this asset to be a noninterest-bearing nominal asset. It is well
known that nominal prices fell drastically during the Depression. If agents
save in a nominal asset, the fall in the price level would provide some relief to
unemployed workers. Does this eﬀect change the welfare estimates?
Inspection of de-trended CPI series shows that prices fell 14.8 percent very
quickly with the onset of the Depression and stayed at the level until 1937
and then fell some more in 1938 and 1939. To model this change in prices,
we assumed that the price level remains constant at one during good and bad
s t a t e sa n dt h e nd e c l i n e st o0.852 in depressions. The operating characteristics
and welfare gain (from eliminating depressions) of this economy are shown in
Table 4.
Table 4
The Eﬀect of Changes in the Price Level






3S 1.08 0.54 0.9622 0.0858 0.1320
2S 0.92 0.29 0.9705 0.0738 0.1178
As is evident, there is very little change in the welfare estimate. Basically,
whatever gain unemployed workers receive with a fall in the price level at the
onset of a depression is reversed when the depression ends and prices go back
up again. Also, note that there are more unemployed workers at the end of a
depression than at the beginning.
20The Eﬀect of A Positive Asset Return in Non-Depression States
I ts e e m sp l a u s i b l et h a tt h er a t eo fr e t u r no nt h ea s s e tm a yc h a n g ew i t ht h e
onset of a depression. In particular, the asset may have a positive return during
normal times, but a zero return in depressions. Ignoring price level changes,
this may happen if the asset is a government bond. During normal times, the
government competes with private liabilities and so must pay a positive return
on its securities. During depressions, when there is a ﬂight to liquidity, the
interest rate on the government bond may well go to zero. With this in mind,
we calculated the welfare gains when the real return on the asset is 2 percent
in good and bad times but zero in depressions. Table 5 reports the results.
Table 5
The Eﬀect of a Positive Asset Return in Non-Depression States






3S 1.38 0.62 0.9604 0.0786 0.1320
2S 1.24 0.39 0.9684 0.0652 0.1178
Again, there is very little change in the estimate of the welfare gain.
The Eﬀect of Perfect Unemployment Insurance in Non-Depression
States
Here we attempt to capture the following situation. Suppose that there are
two kinds of assets, private and government. In normal times, the return on
the private asset is close to the rate of discount, and the return on the gov-
ernment asset is zero. In a depression, return on the government asset is still
zero, but the private assets become worthless. In this kind of a world, it’s rea-
sonable to suppose that workers will accumulate stocks of the private asset to
self-insure themselves against the risk of unemployment in normal (i.e., good
and bad) times but use the government asset to insure against unemployment
during depressions. If the rate of return on the private asset is close to the
21rate of discount, we know from Bewley (1977) that the worker will accumu-
late enough assets to almost perfectly insure against unemployment risk during
normal times. Therefore, a rough way to capture this situation is to assume
that both employed and unemployed workers receive the per-capita endowment
in the good and bad states (so there is no risk of loss of income due to un-
employment in these times) but confront uninsured unemployment risk in the
depression state. Table 6 reports the results from this experiment.
Table 6
The Eﬀect of Perfect Unemployment Insurance in Non-Depression States






3S 0.19 0.66 0.9623 0.0544 0.1320
2S 0 0 0.9705 0.0054 0.1178
As one would expect, asset holdings are lower in this economy since workers
no longer need to hold assets to insure against loss of employment during normal
times. In the three-state economy, the average asset holding is about one-ﬁfth
of monthly income while in the two-state economy it is zero. The latter result
reﬂects the fact that in the two-state economy uncertainty in individual earnings
is very small (it reﬂects only aggregate uncertainty), and with the discount
rate substantially above the real rate of return all agents ﬁnd it optimal to set
consumption equal to per-capita earnings.
The welfare gain from eliminating the possibility of depressions is now higher.
Comparing operating characteristics of this three-state economy with the three-
state baseline model (reported in Table 2) we ﬁnd the volatility of individual
consumption is lower than in the baseline model, while mean consumption is
identical. Thus, the higher welfare gains relative to the baseline model don’t
stem from higher volatility of consumption in the three-state world. Rather,
it stems from the fact there is now virtually no uncertainty in consumption
in the two-state economy. In eﬀect, agents receive the certainty equivalent
of the random consumption stream of the baseline two-state economy (mean
22consumption across these two-state economies is the same), and they are willing
to pay more for that privilege. This is reﬂected in the fact that now the increase
in mean consumption (between the two-state and three-state environments)
accounts for only 73 percent of the increase in welfare (as compared with 80
percent in the baseline model).
7.2 Alternative Histories
Depression State Deﬁned as Unemployment Rate in Excess of 20 Percent
In this experiment, we deﬁn e dd e p r e s s i o nm o n t h st ob ea l lm o n t h so fa n y
year in which the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent. We re-estimated the
aggregate state transition matrix based on this new history. Now, the period
1930-1939 is broken up into two depression episodes, one between 1930 and

























           

Notice that since the duration of the depression state has fallen, λdd has fallen
relative to the baseline. On the other hand, the two instances of transition to the
depression state raises the conditional probability of entering a depression λdb
relative to the baseline, and the average unemployment rate in the depression-
like state is now slightly higher as well (24.98 percent versus 23.48 percent in
the baseline model). The results of the welfare calculations (reported in Table
7) reveal that these changes roughly oﬀset each other, leading a slight decline
in the welfare gains from elimination of the depression-like state.
23Table 7
Depression State Deﬁned as Unemployment Rate in Excess of 20 Percent






3S 1.06 0.49 0.9628 0.0850 0.1312
2S 0.92 0.29 0.9705 0.0738 0.1178
Include 1890-1899, with 1894:01-1898:12 Classiﬁed as Depression
Months
There is some fragmentary information on industrial unemployment for the
last decade of the 19th century. In this experiment we extend our history of
aggregate states back to 1890:01 and use this information to determine if any
of those months should be classiﬁed as depression months. The information
available suggests that industrial unemployment for the ﬁve years 1894-1898 was
very high.20 Accordingly, we classiﬁed those 60 months as depression months.
This alters the estimated aggregate transition matrix to
b Λ =






















           

Given the fragmentary nature of unemployment rate data for this period, we
continued to assume that the average unemployment rate in the two depression
episodes was 23.48 percent. The results of the welfare experiment (reported in
Table 8) show that the welfare gains from elimination of the depression state is
now higher.
20See, for instance, Lebergott (1964, Table A-15), Romer (1986, Table 9) and Keyssar (1977,
Ch. 2).
24Table 8
Sample: 1890-1998, with 1894:01-1898:12 Also Classiﬁed as Depression Months






3S 1.40 0.63 0.9589 0.0906 0.1374
2S 0.92 0.29 0.9705 0.0738 0.1178
7.3 Variations in Other Parameters
The Eﬀect of Higher Duration of Unemployment in Depressions
There is uncertainty about the duration of unemployment spells during the
Depression. In this experiment, we raised the duration of unemployment to 20
months, twice that of the baseline model. Table 9 reports the results.
Table 9
Average Duration of Unemployment Spells in a Depression is 20 Months.






3S 1.05 0.54 0.9627 0.0900 0.1313
2S 0.92 0.29 0.9705 0.0738 0.1178
As one would expect, the estimated welfare gains from eliminating a Depression-
like state is now higher than in the baseline model. But the increase in the gain
is not substantial. One reason for this is that when the duration of unem-
ployment spells is raised, the calibration of the model forces us to lower the
probability with which an employed worker gets unemployed in a depression.
Without this oﬀsetting change, the average unemployment rate in a depression
would rise above 23.48 percent. This factor tends to pull down the estimated
welfare gains.
The Eﬀect of Higher Risk Aversion
In this experiment, we raised the risk aversion parameter to 3, twice that of
t h eb a s e l i n em o d e l .
25Table 10
Risk-aversion Parameter γ =3 .0






3S 2.17 1.00 0.9623 0.0678 0.1320
2S 1.86 0.53 0.9705 0.0543 0.1178
Not surprisingly, the welfare gain from elimination of the depression state is
higher.
The Eﬀect of Greater Earnings Loss
In this experiment, we set the earnings-loss parameter to 0.2, which is the
lower end of its likely range suggested by Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright
(1995).
Table 11
Earnings-Loss Parameter is 1/5
Steady-State Characteristics of the 2-state and 3-state Models






3S 3.39 1.56 0.9397 0.1106 0.2112
2S 2.89 0.78 0.9528 0.0894 0.1885
The greater variability in earnings results in much higher average asset hold-
ings; compared with the baseline calibration, agents now hold more than three
times as much assets in the three-state world. The volatility of consumption is
higher as well compared with the baseline model. The steady-state welfare gain
from eliminating depressions is now 2.01 percent, while the gain inclusive of
transition eﬀects is 2.22 percent. The component of this gain that results from
an increase in mean consumption is around 69 percent. Thus, changes in the
higher moments of the distribution of individual consumption contribute more
to the increase in welfare than in the baseline model (the contribution of higher
m o m e n t st oc h a n g ei nw e l f a r ei nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e lw a s19 percent).
267.4 A Less Conservative Calibration
Our baseline case was computed under a conservative set of assumptions on key
parameters. Here we consider a less conservative scenario where we assume the
risk-aversion parameter is set at 3, the earnings-loss parameter is set at 1/5,
the average duration of unemployment spells in a depression is 20 months, and
there is perfect unemployment insurance in nondepression states. Thus, this less
conservative calibration combines the experiments done in the previous sections.
We report the results of this case in Table 12.
Table 12
A Less Conservative Calibration
Steady-State Characteristics of the 2-state and 3-state Models






3S 1.47 2.61 0.9404 0.0952 0.2101
2S 0 0 0.9525 0.0086 0.1885
Now the welfare gain from elimination of a Depression-like state is 6 percent
or more. Also, conditional on being in a depression, the steady-state gain from
elimination of the depression state is almost 19 percent. These estimates are
now strikingly large and, in our view, more indicative of the true welfare gains
to be had from elimination of the likelihood of Depression-like events.
It is of some interest to note that the combined eﬀect of the four departures
from the baseline calibration is much larger than the sum of their separate ef-
fects. Separately, these departures raised the steady-state welfare gain by 0.19
percent (risk aversion raised to 3), 0.96 percent (earnings loss from unemploy-
ment raised to 4/5 of employed earnings), 0.06 percent (average duration of
unemployment spells raised to 20 months), and 0.13 percent (perfect unemploy-
ment insurance in nondepression states) which brings their sum to only 1.34
percent.
27It is also of interest to note that now the increase in mean consumption in
the two-state environment accounts for only 21 percent of the increase in steady-
state welfare. The rest of the gains come from changes in the higher moments
of the consumption distribution. This decomposition is almost exactly opposite
to that found for the baseline calibration.
8 Does Uninsured Earnings Risk Matter?
In this section, we assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of uninsured employment
risk for a Depression-like event. We do this by calculating the welfare gain from
eliminating the depression state in an environment in which there is complete
pooling of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. So, in this environment each agent
receives the per-capita endowment of the economy in every aggregate state.
Table 13 reports the results from this “representative agent” experiment when
all parameter values are held at their baseline choices.
Table 13
The Eﬀect of Full Unemployment Insurance in the Baseline Model






3S 0 0 0.9619 0.0266 0.1320
2S 0 0 0.9705 0.0054 0.1178
Eliminating uninsured employment risk eliminates the need to save. The
uncertainty in earnings is too low to overcome the diﬀerence in the rate of
return on savings (zero) and the rate of discount (six percent, annualized). As
one would expect, allowing risksharing lowers the gains from the elimination of
depressions. In particular, the steady-state welfare gains are roughly 12 percent
higher in the baseline economy without unemployment insurance, and the gains
inclusive of the transition path are 18 percent higher.
Thus, for the baseline calibration, the existence of uninsured earnings risk
does raise the gains from eliminating depressions. However, the diﬀerence is not
28large. But the situation is quite diﬀerent for the less conservative calibration
discussed in the previous section. Table 14 reports the gain from eliminating
depressions for that environment if there is perfect risk sharing.
Table 14
The Eﬀect of Full Unemployment Insurance in the Less Conservative Model






3S 0 0 0.9390 0.0425 0.2101
2S 0 0 0.9525 0.0086 0.1885
As in the baseline model, complete risksharing eliminates the need to save.
The gain from eliminating depressions is now 1.72 percent. For this less-
conservative environment we imposed perfect insurance against loss of earnings
from unemployment in the good and bad states but not in the depression state.
The welfare gain from elimination of the depression state was calculated to be
6.00 percent and 6.59 percent (steady state and inclusive of transition eﬀects,
respectively). Therefore, in this case the existence of uninsured earnings risk
matters a great deal. The welfare gain in the absence of complete risksharing is
close to four times that when full risksharing is imposed.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Our aim in this paper was to obtain a measure for the potential beneﬁt of policies
that reduce the likelihood of a Depression-style collapse of economic activity in
the US for the period 1900-1998. In principle our approach could be applied to
economic crises in other countries and for other sample periods. For the US,
we found that even when the probability of transiting into a Depression-like
state is about once in every 83 years, the welfare gain from setting this small
probability to zero can range between 1.05 percent and 6.60 percent of annual
consumption, in perpetuity. By standards of welfare analysis, these are large
gains. In particular, they are more than 100 times larger than the estimated
29welfare gains from eliminating normal business cycle volatility reported in Lucas
(1987) for comparable risk-aversion parameters. These large gains arise because
even though the probability of transiting to a Depression-like state is small, it’s
highly persistent. This persistence plays a large role in the estimates of welfare
gain reported in this paper. We also ﬁnd that uninsured unemployment risk
may contribute signiﬁcantly to the size of these gains. For instance, in the case
where the gains are in excess of six percent, a representative agent calculation
would yield a welfare gain that is only about one-fourth as large.
While we have quantiﬁed the potential gain from pursuing policies that re-
duce the likelihood of economic crises, we have not said anything about the
potential costs of doing so. In particular, we have not speciﬁed any policy ar-
rangement that could set the probability of economic crises to zero. However,
by pointing out the welfare gains from eliminating even a small probability of
encountering a Depression-like state, we are suggesting that it’s worthwhile to
determine what policies reduce the likelihood of economic crises and how they
would be implemented.
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Fig.11:Value Functions of Employed in Bad State in 2 vs 3 State Model
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